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Can the Cross-Sectional Variation in Expected Stock 
Returns Explain Momentum? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
It has been hypothesized that momentum might be rationally explained as a 
consequence of the cross-sectional variation of unconditional expected returns. Stocks 
with relatively high unconditional expected returns will on average outperform in 
both the portfolio formation period and in the subsequent holding period. We evaluate 
this explanation by first removing unconditional expected returns for each stock from 
raw returns and then test for momentum in the resulting series. We measure the 
unconditional expected return on each stock as its mean return in the whole sample 
period. We find momentum effects vanish in demeaned returns.  
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Can the Cross-Sectional Variation in Expected Stock 
Returns Explain Momentum? 
 
I. Introduction 
Evidence that portfolios of stocks that have recently performed relatively well go on 
to deliver higher returns in the near future than those that have recently performed 
relatively badly was reported by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Subsequent work has 
confirmed the robustness of this result. Similar findings are reported both in samples 
of data observed after the result was first documented, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), 
Korajczyk and Sadka (2004), and in data from different countries, Rouwenhorst 
(1998).  
This evidence is widely interpreted as evidence of time-varying returns for individual 
stocks and the problem is then to explain, in the context of a conventional model of 
asset-pricing, why time variation in expected returns might exhibit momentum. Fama 
(1998) has described this apparent anomaly as one of the most difficult to explain in a 
model of rational asset-pricing and understanding this result has become an important 
challenge. Theoretical models that have subsequently been proposed to explain time-
varying expected returns that are consistent with evidence of momentum include 
Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) and Johnson (2002).  
Empirical work has investigated whether these results might be rationally explained 
by positive serial correlation in factor returns so that momentum strategies will pick 
stocks with high loadings on factor portfolios that have a relatively high conditional 
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expected return. However Fama and French (1996) and Grundy and Martin (2001) 
find that momentum effects persist after controlling for time variation in returns using 
the Fama and French three-factor model. A notable success is that of Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2002) who do successfully identify a small set of macro factors that can 
explain momentum. If there is an explanation for momentum based on macro factors 
one would expect to see this show up in industry returns and several authors have 
investigated whether momentum of individual stocks simply reflects industry 
momentum. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) report evidence that industry effects can 
largely explain the evidence although in subsequent work Grundy and Martin (2001), 
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002), Lewellen (2002) and Ahn, Conrad, and Dittmar 
(2003) all find that stock momentum cannot be fully accounted for by industry 
momentum.   
A different perspective on momentum is that it does not reflect time-varying returns 
but simply cross-sectional differences in unconditional expected returns between 
stocks, where expected returns might for example be determined by the capital asset 
pricing model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). Stocks with relatively high 
unconditional expected returns will outperform in both portfolio formation periods 
and subsequent holding periods. This point is noted by Lo and MacKinlay (1990), 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and developed further by Conrad and Kaul (1998). 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) investigate the hypothesis that momentum profits could 
be explained by the cross-sectional dispersion of unconditional expected returns, but 
they rejected this explanation, using size and beta as a measure of expected returns.  
In this paper we take a different approach to testing whether momentum can be 
explained by the cross-sectional dispersion in expected returns. In the absence of any 
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consensus about the correct model for expected returns we measure the unconditional 
expected return for each stock as the average return on that stock over the full sample 
period. We then remove this estimate of expected returns from raw returns and apply 
the conventional tests for momentum to the resulting series of demeaned returns, our 
empirical measure of (unconditionally) unexpected returns. In Section II we describe 
our approach in more detail, in Section III we describe our data and methodology, in 
Section IV we report results, and Section V concludes. 
II. Testing the Hypothesis that the Cross-Sectional Variation in 
Expected Returns Explains Momentum 
The problem in testing whether the cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected 
returns can explain momentum using any specific model of expected returns is that if 
there is any model error, then the resulting residual dispersion in expected returns that 
are not captured by the model will show up as momentum. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(2001) note this problem and adopt an approach that does not require specification of 
a model of expected returns. Their test specifically serves to evaluate the model of 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) who assume that expected returns are rationally determined, 
different across stocks, and time invariant. This model implies that returns for holding 
periods of any length should be positively correlated with returns in the portfolio 
formation periods. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) report that on the contrary, when the 
portfolio holding period is increased beyond twelve months, then past winners start to 
become losers, and hence infer that returns are time-varying and so reject the model 
of Conrad and Kaul as an explanation for momentum. 
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The methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) does establish that there is a time-
varying component to returns, since returns on “winner” portfolios, which were 
initially positive, became negative as holding periods are increased beyond one year. 
Return reversals clearly cannot be explained away by the cross-sectional dispersion of 
expected returns. However it does not directly address the source of the momentum 
profits in the short term. For example the results of Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the cross-sectional dispersion in expected returns 
explains the profits to momentum strategies at horizons of under a year and that the 
only time-varying component to returns takes the form of reversals, which overwhelm 
the effect of the dispersion in unconditional expected returns at longer horizons.  
In this paper we focus on the question of whether there is also, at shorter horizons, a 
momentum component to time-varying returns, in addition to the reversals at longer 
horizons identified by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). We apply the idea, introduced by 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990), and emphasised by Conrad and Kaul (1998), that the 
success of returns based trading strategies should be decomposed into a component 
due to the cross-sectional dispersion in unconditional expected returns and a 
component due to time-series variation in stock returns. In the absence of any 
consensus about the correct model of expected returns we take an empirical approach 
and measure the unconditional expected return on each stock as the mean return for 
that stock measured over the full sample period1. We then remove the component of 
stock returns due to the cross-sectional dispersion of expected returns by subtracting 
                                                 
1 We actually use a two-step procedure to demean which we describe in Section 2. For ease of 
exposition we simply describe our method as demeaning, which captures the spirit of our methodology. 
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the sample mean return for each stock from its raw return at each date and test for 
evidence of momentum in the resulting series of demeaned returns2.  
The objective here is not to test a new trading strategy but to better understand why a 
conventional momentum strategy is successful. If we were to find evidence of 
momentum in demeaned returns this would not imply that a profitable trading rule to 
exploit this time variation could have been employed in practice. An investor trading 
in real time cannot purchase portfolios on the basis of returns that are adjusted at each 
date using a sample mean constructed from data that are not yet available. However a 
necessary condition for such a strategy being profitable is that there is a significant 
time-varying component to returns, superimposed on the cross-sectional dispersion in 
unconditional returns. If we were to find momentum in demeaned returns then this 
would beg the further interesting question of whether investors, trading in calendar 
time and estimating mean stock returns from only past data, could profit by a 
momentum trading strategy. However since we find that a momentum trading strategy 
would not even be profitable to a trader who had the advantage of measuring 
unconditional expected returns by full sample means, this further question does not 
arise.  
                                                 
2 Lo and MacKinlay (1990) also note that the time-varying component of returns to trading strategies 
can be further decomposed into that due to the autocorrelation in individual security returns and that 
due cross-autocorrelations between securities. However they report evidence for cross-effects only at 
weekly horizons, which they explain by non-synchronous trading and bid-ask spreads.  Since we find 
no evidence of momentum in demeaned returns, at the longer horizons that we study, we do not pursue 
this further decomposition.  
 
 8
We start by confirming that momentum effects are still present in raw returns in a data 
set extended to 1965–2005, using a similar methodology to that of Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). We then apply the same tests to the series of demeaned returns. We 
find no evidence for momentum in demeaned returns. We also test two further 
implications of this explanation for momentum. If portfolios are formed on the basis 
of raw returns we should expect to find that stocks with relatively high mean returns, 
measured over the full sample, are on average over-represented in “winner” portfolios 
and under-represented in “loser” portfolios (and conversely for low mean return 
stocks). Secondly, if the reason that portfolios of “winners” perform relatively well is 
that they are over-weight in high unconditional expected returns stocks, then 
portfolios that are constructed on the basis of high sample means should perform even 
better, since recent returns are a relatively noisier measure of unconditional expected 
returns. On the other hand if the reason that “winners” outperform is that these 
portfolios exploit momentum, then discarding information on recent returns should 
lead to lower subsequent returns3. We find that winner-loser portfolios are relatively 
over weight in stocks with high unconditional expected returns and that returns to 
portfolios formed on full sample means are greater than to those formed on recent 
momentum. In Section II we describe our data and methodology, in Section III we 
report results, and Section IV concludes. 
III. Measurement of Expected Returns and Construction of Tests 
The objective is to capture the dispersion of unconditional expected returns in a way 
that is not contingent on any specific model of asset pricing. Our approach is to 
measure the unconditional expected returns on a stock by the average of the realized 
                                                 
3 We thank the referee for suggesting both of these corollaries. 
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returns on that stock in the full sample. However in order to implement this idea we 
first remove the market return at each date and calculate the mean difference between 
the return on each stock and the market. The reason for this two step procedure is that 
many stocks are listed only for sub-periods and there is substantial time variation in 
aggregate stock returns, even measured over horizons of several years. Simply 
measuring a stock’s unconditional expected return by its average return would mean 
that the estimate of an individual stock’s expected return would inherit the properties 
of the market return during its listing. This would introduce a significant bias into the 
estimates of expected returns, the size and direction of which would depend on the 
performance of the market during the listing of the different stocks. For example 
suppose the cross-sectional dispersion in expected returns is explained by the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model. Consider two stocks with the same Beta, but suppose also that 
one stock has only been listed for the last five years, which happened to be a period of 
high returns to the whole market, but the other has been listed for a longer period, 
spanning both bull and bear markets. Then the mean return calculated directly from 
raw returns would typically be higher for the stock that was only listed during the bull 
phase. Our two-stage procedure eliminates this bias. 
This two-step procedure is summarized as follows. For any month t, we subtract the 
return on a market portfolio, tmR , , from each stock’s return, tiR , , to give a market-
adjusted return, tmtiti RRR ,,,ˆ −= . tiR ,ˆ  is further decomposed into an unconditional 
firm specific expected return, )ˆ( iRE , and the deviation from this, tiR ,
ˆˆ , giving: 
)ˆ(ˆˆˆ ,, ititi RERR −= . 
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tiR ,
ˆˆ  is our measure of the demeaned return on stock i at date t. It is the difference 
between the deviation from the market of raw returns on stock i at date t and the 
average deviation of raw returns on stock i from the market. )ˆ( ,tiRE  is empirically 
calculated as: 
∑
=
−= S
t
tmtii RRS
RE
1
,, )(
1)ˆ( , 
where S is the total number of time-series observations available for a particular stock 
i available in our sample period. We then rank stocks and record subsequent 
performance using the series of demeaned returns, tiR ,
ˆˆ . This methodology cannot be 
expected to give reliable results for stocks that are only listed for short periods and 
therefore we exclude from the sample stocks that are listed for less than twenty-four 
months.  
We evaluate the profitability of momentum strategies in both raw returns and 
demeaned returns as follows. In a month t, stocks are ranked in ascending order 
according to their previous J-month cumulated returns. The top decile of the sorted 
stocks is labeled the ‘winner’ portfolio and the bottom decile the ‘loser’ portfolio. K-
month average cumulated equally-weighted returns, rebalancing every month, are 
computed for the respective portfolios. We consider strategies for all combinations of 
J and K equal to 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. Holding period returns are calculated starting 
at the same date t that stocks are ranked and portfolios formed4. Repeating this 
                                                 
4 Some authors skip a week or a month before starting to calculate holding period returns so when 
comparing results with others reported in the literature the fact that we do not skip any time before 
computing holding period returns may lengthen the initial period over which negative returns are 
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strategy each successive month would induce the interrelated problems of overlapping 
returns and overlapping formation periods, which would induce serial correlation in 
the constituents of portfolios. Therefore when we measure returns to a K month 
holding strategy we skip K months before reforming portfolios. This always ensures 
returns for successive momentum portfolios do not overlap, and for symmetric 
strategies, or when J < K, it also ensures that portfolio formation periods do not 
overlap.  
We apply tests to the original 1965–1989 period studied by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) and to the extended period 1965–2005. For both periods we study two 
samples, all NYSE and AMEX stocks, as in the original study of Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) and in the Appendix we report results for the full sample of NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. Data on individual stock returns and market indices are 
taken from CRSP monthly files. 
IV. Results 
Our NYSE/AMEX sample differs slightly from that of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
because we exclude firms with less than 24 months of returns data, for reasons 
explained above, and so the first step is to investigate whether this could itself directly 
affect the evidence for momentum. We report in Panel A of Table 1 results for our 
sample using raw returns for the same horizon that is used by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993). It can be seen that excluding stocks with less than 24 months of returns data 
makes no significant difference to the evidence. For example in the 1965–1989 
period, we find that the 6 × 6 strategy of going long in “winners” and short in 
                                                                                                                                            
observed, if there are return reversals at short horizons, but should make little difference at intermediate 
and longer horizons. 
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“losers” generates a 0.93% abnormal return per month, significant at the 99% level, 
whereas Jegadeesh and Titman report that the same strategy yielded monthly profits 
of 0.95%, also significant at the 99% level. 
[Table 1 around here] 
In Panel B of Table 1 we report results for a sample period extended up to December 
2005. Momentum appears to be just as much in evidence in the extended sample 
period as it was in the original 1965-1989 period.  For example the same 6 × 6 
strategy now yields an average return of 0.78% per month, again significant at the 
99% level. In Table A1 in the Appendix we report results for the same two sample 
periods where NASDAQ stocks are also included. For the shorter sample period, 
inclusion of NASDAQ stocks weakens, but does not eliminate, the evidence for 
momentum. However for the period 1965-2005, although point estimates of the 
returns to a momentum strategy remain largely positive, the estimates are statistically 
significant for only three strategies. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) include NASDAQ 
firms and find that momentum is still significant, but this is for a sample period that 
ended in 1997. They also exclude firms from all exchanges that have a share price 
under $5 or a market capitalization below the smallest NYSE decile cut-off point. 
Given the typical characteristic of NASDAQ stocks, we conjecture that simply 
excluding them may have much the same effect as excluding stocks on this criterion 
from all exchanges. Why momentum is so much in evidence in the class of stocks 
traded on the main exchanges, but not in the smaller stocks typically traded on 
NASDAQ, is itself an interesting question for future research. But whatever the 
reason that including NASDAQ stocks weakens the evidence for momentum, the fact 
remains that there is evidence of momentum that is as significant as ever in the 
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NYSE/AMEX sample extended to 2005. A momentum trading strategy can be applied 
to the universe of NYSE/AMEX stocks alone and the question remains: how can the 
profits to such a strategy be explained?  
In Table 2 we report results for the same trading strategies except that demeaned 
returns (as defined in Section 2) are used in place of raw returns to both rank stocks 
and measure subsequent performance.  
[Table 2 around here] 
In can be seen in Table 2 that the momentum effects that were present in Table 1 
largely vanish when we remove the cross-sectional variation in unconditional 
expected returns. There is now no evidence of significant positive returns for any 
momentum trading strategy in the full period. For the sub-period 1965-1989, there are 
only three combinations of J and K for which a momentum strategy delivers 
significant profits. We infer that the success of momentum strategies applied to raw 
returns is not explained by time-varying returns but by the fact they pick stocks with 
high unconditional returns. 
A different approach to determining whether the success of the momentum strategy is 
due to time-varying returns or to the fact that it simply picks stocks with high 
unconditional means, is to compare the performance of portfolios selected on one 
criterion or the other. Of course full sample means cannot be used in a trading rule in 
practice but the objective of this horse race is to investigate the source of the returns 
to a momentum trading strategy, not to compare the profits on two feasible trading 
strategies. In Figure 1 we trace returns over 3-12 months on two winner-loser 
portfolios, one selected each month on the basis of raw returns measured over the last 
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3-12 months, and the other on the basis of their unconditional means estimated over 
the whole sample, with no account taken of recent time variation. It is clear for all 
horizons that a strategy based on unconditional means, and that ignores recent 
momentum, is consistently more successful than one based on recent performance. 
For a horizon of 3 months, the unconditional portfolios beat the momentum portfolios 
in 87% of months, at 6 months this figure in 88%, 9 months 89%, and at 12 months 
this figure rises to 95%.  
[Figure 1 around here] 
If recent momentum is successful because it is a noisy measure of unconditional 
means then portfolios formed on unconditional means should not only be more 
successful on average but also returns to the strategy should be less volatile. This 
expectation is confirmed. For example over all four symmetric strategies, on 33% of 
start dates the conditional momentum strategy delivers negative returns, but on only 
1% of start months does the selection of stocks on the basis of unconditional means 
deliver negative returns. For 3 × 3 strategy, the standard deviation of returns on 
conditional momentum strategies is 3.5%, and for unconditional momentum strategies 
is 2.1%; for 6 × 6, the corresponding standard deviations are 2.4%, and 1.7%; for 9 × 
9, they are 2%, and 1.6%; for 12 × 12, the figures are 1.7%, and 1.5%.  
[Figures 2 and 3 around here] 
A final implication of this explanation for momentum is that when winner-loser 
portfolios are constructed on the basis of raw returns we should observe that long 
positions are overweight in stocks with high unconditional returns and short positions 
are overweight in stocks with low unconditional returns. In Figures 2 and 3, we trace 
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the percentage of firms from the top 25 and top 50 percentile of unconditional means 
that appear in winner and loser portfolios, measured by raw returns, for each 
formation period. It can be seen that this prediction is largely confirmed. For 96% of 
start dates, across all symmetric strategies, the percentage of top 50 percentile of 
unconditional mean stocks is greater in winner portfolios than loser portfolios. For 
89% of start dates stocks from the highest 25 percentile of unconditional returns are a 
larger percentage of winner portfolios than loser portfolios.  
V. Conclusion  
There is compelling evidence that a momentum trading strategy is profitable, at least 
when applied to the universe of NYSE/AMEX stocks, but the reasons for its success 
are unclear. Is it profitable because of time-varying returns or does it simply reflect 
the cross-sectional variation in unconditional expected returns? The contribution of 
this paper is to report evidence that attempts to distinguish between these two 
explanations. We decompose raw returns into a term that reflects unconditional 
expected returns and a residual. We sidestep the problem of specifying a specific 
model of unconditional expected returns by measuring these as simply the full sample 
mean return on each stock. We then apply the conventional tests to the demeaned 
returns and find that there is no evidence for momentum in this series.  
If it is the cross-sectional dispersion in unconditional expected returns that explains 
momentum in raw returns then this has two further implications. Firstly, we should 
expect to see that “winner” portfolios tend to select stocks with high unconditional 
returns and “loser” portfolios tend to select low unconditional returns stocks, and this 
prediction is confirmed. Secondly, if the reason that portfolios of recent “winners” 
subsequently outperform is because they select stocks with relatively high 
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unconditional returns then portfolios of stocks with high means measured over the full 
sample should on average do even better. On the other hand this latter strategy 
discards information in recent returns, and hence should deliver lower profits if the 
key to the success of “winner” portfolios is that they exploit momentum. We report 
that portfolios formed on the basis of full sample means are systematically more 
profitable, providing further support for the hypothesis that the success of momentum 
strategies simply reflects the cross-sectional dispersion of expected returns. 
We conclude on a note of caution. We are able to attribute the profitability of 
momentum trading strategies to the cross-sectional variation in expected returns, but 
we employ an atheoretical empirical measure of expected returns. The evidence to 
date is that momentum cannot be explained by using a conventional model of 
expected returns, for example the three factor Fama-French model. It will only be 
possible to claim to have thoroughly vindicated the efficient markets model when 
evidence for momentum vanishes after extracting the cross-sectional dispersion in 
expected returns, where these are measured using a fully articulated model of risk 
pricing.  
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Figure 1 Time series of returns to portfolios formed on momentum and unconditional expected 
returns 
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Notes: This figure compares the time-series of returns on winner-loser portfolios ranked on the 
basis of recent momentum with those ranked on sample means. The dashed line shows the 
monthly returns of momentum portfolios based on J-month past returns and held for J months. 
The solid line represents the monthly returns of portfolios ranked by sample means held for J 
months. The sample includes all NYSE and AMEX stocks on monthly CRSP files with more 
than twenty-four return observations available over the sample period, January 1965 – December 
2005.
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Figure 2 Time series of the percentages of firms in the winner/loser portfolio (based on 
J-month raw returns) from the top 25 percentile firms in their unconditional means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the time series evolution of the percentages of firms in the 
winner/loser portfolios from the top 25 percentile firms in their unconditional means. 
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Portfolios are formed based on past J-month raw returns. The sample includes all 
NYSE and AMEX stocks on monthly CRSP files with more than twenty-four return 
observations available over the sample period, January 1965 – December 2005. 
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Figure 3 Time series of the percentages of firms in the winner/loser portfolio (based on 
J-month raw returns) from the top 50 percentile firms in their unconditional means 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the time series evolution of the percentages of firms in the 
winner/loser portfolios from the top 50 percentile firms in their unconditional means. 
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AMEX stocks on monthly CRSP files with more than twenty-four return observations 
available over the sample period, January 1965 – December 2005. 
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Table 1 
Profitability of relative strength portfolios based on raw returns, NYSE/AMEX 
      Panel A: 1965-1989 Panel B: 1965-2005 
 J     K = 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 
3 Winner  0.0131 0.0153 0.0166 0.0162 0.0134 0.0149 0.0171 0.0158 
   (2.96) (3.48) (3.55) (3.92) (4.11) (4.64) (5.26) (4.90) 
3 Loser  0.0111 0.0094 0.0086 0.0079 0.0127 0.0108 0.0099 0.0091 
   (2.08) (2.06) (1.60) (2.24) (3.00) (2.92) (2.53) (2.74) 
3 Winner-Loser 0.0020 0.0059 0.0080 0.0083 0.0007 0.0042 0.0072 0.0067 
   (0.68) (2.63) (3.08) (3.69) (0.27) (2.10) (3.28) (2.92) 
            
6 Winner  0.0166 0.0174 0.0177 0.0163 0.0166 0.0170 0.0182 0.0156 
   (3.68) (3.97) (3.81) (4.22) (5.11) (5.41) (5.83) (5.33) 
6 Loser  0.0099 0.0082 0.0066 0.0085 0.0109 0.0093 0.0088 0.0097 
   (1.81) (1.73) (1.22) (1.99) (2.47) (2.49) (2.21) (2.67) 
6 Winner-Loser 0.0067 0.0093 0.0110 0.0077 0.0056 0.0077 0.0094 0.0059 
   (2.09) (3.62) (3.51) (3.00) (2.00) (3.68) (3.76) (2.40) 
            
9 Winner  0.0183 0.0188 0.0172 0.0160 0.0188 0.0187 0.0176 0.0152 
   (3.99) (4.27) (3.59) (4.37) (5.71) (5.85) (5.44) (5.66) 
9 Loser  0.0081 0.0064 0.0075 0.0092 0.0099 0.0085 0.0099 0.0115 
   (1.46) (1.34) (1.35) (1.96) (2.22) (2.19) (2.38) (2.92) 
9 Winner-Loser 0.0102 0.0123 0.0096 0.0068 0.0088 0.0102 0.0077 0.0037 
   (3.19) (4.81) (3.30) (2.34) (3.18) (4.46) (3.09) (1.44) 
            
12 Winner  0.0189 0.0182 0.0160 0.0154 0.0185 0.0175 0.0163 0.0144 
   (4.08) (4.20) (3.50) (4.05) (5.62) (5.53) (5.29) (5.26) 
12 Loser  0.0066 0.0080 0.0082 0.0100 0.0092 0.0101 0.0110 0.0125 
   (1.20) (1.61) (1.39) (2.20) (2.07) (2.54) (2.50) (3.24) 
12 Winner-Loser 0.0124 0.0102 0.0078 0.0054 0.0093 0.0074 0.0053 0.0018 
      (3.99) (4.04) (2.51) (2.24) (3.37) (3.13) (1.91) (0.77) 
This table reports the profitability of selected relative strength portfolios based on raw returns. In each 
month t, J-month/K-month (J ×  K) portfolios are formed in the following way. J-month cumulative 
returns are calculated based on a ranking in ascending order of stocks according to their previous J-month 
returns. The top decile of the sorted stocks is labeled the ‘winner’ portfolio and the bottom decile the 
‘loser’ portfolio. The ‘winner–loser’ portfolio reports the strategy of going long in winners and short in 
losers. The monthly cumulative returns on these three portfolios are reported. Panel A contains the returns 
in the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) sample period, January 1965 – December 1989. Panel B presents the 
returns in the extended January 1965 – December 2005 sample period. The portfolios are equally-
weighted at formation date. Portfolio formation takes place immediately after ranking is done. The t-
statistics are given in parentheses. Each sample consists of all NYSE and AMEX stocks on monthly 
CRSP files with more than twenty-four return observations available over the sample period. 
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Table 2 
Profitability of relative strength portfolios based on unexpected returns, NYSE/AMEX 
   Panel A: 1965-1989 Panel B: 1965-2005 
J  K = 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 
3 Winner  -0.0026 -0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0004 0.0015 0.0007 
   (-1.82) (-0.45) (0.56) (0.45) (-1.76) (-0.43) (1.37) (0.59) 
3 Loser  -0.0004 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0048 0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0028 
   (-0.22) (-1.67) (-1.42) (-3.68) (0.90) (-0.40) (-0.68) (-1.60) 
3 Winner-Loser -0.0021 0.0021 0.0033 0.0056 -0.0038 0.0003 0.0026 0.0035 
   (-0.76) (0.98) (1.34) (2.46) (-1.46) (0.13) (1.17) (1.48) 
           
6 Winner  0.0002 0.0010 0.0013 0.0008 0.0007 0.0015 0.0023 0.0003 
   (0.16) (0.73) (0.85) (0.51) (0.55) (1.30) (2.12) (0.21) 
6 Loser  -0.0011 -0.0029 -0.0041 -0.0032 0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0015 
   (-0.51) (-1.72) (-2.12) (-1.95) (0.31) (-0.67) (-0.87) (-0.83) 
6 Winner-Loser 0.0013 0.0039 0.0054 0.0039 0.0000 0.0026 0.0039 0.0018 
   (0.44) (1.68) (1.84) (1.68) (0.00) (1.25) (1.55) (0.68) 
           
9 Winner  0.0015 0.0019 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0018 0.0018 0.0010 -0.0014 
   (0.90) (1.37) (0.24) (-0.39) (1.56) (1.65) (0.90) (-1.14) 
9 Loser  -0.0019 -0.0051 -0.0030 -0.0022 0.0006 -0.0019 0.0000 0.0006 
   (-0.89) (-2.94) (-1.58) (-1.09) (0.26) (-1.01) (0.01) (0.28) 
9 Winner-Loser 0.0033 0.0071 0.0033 0.0016 0.0013 0.0037 0.0010 -0.0020 
   (1.11) (2.91) (1.24) (0.60) (0.46) (1.62) (0.38) (-0.71) 
           
12 Winner  0.0015 0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0014 0.0015 0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0021 
   (0.96) (0.61) (-0.86) (-1.03) (1.26) (0.83) (-0.70) (-1.74) 
12 Loser  -0.0038 -0.0032 -0.0022 -0.0011 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0016 0.0022 
   (-1.87) (-1.81) (-1.03) (-0.60) (-0.14) (0.06) (0.76) (1.05) 
12 Winner-Loser 0.0053 0.0040 0.0010 -0.0003 0.0018 0.0008 -0.0024 -0.0043 
   (1.85) (1.73) (0.36) (-0.13) (0.66) (0.33) (-0.85) (-1.61) 
This table reports the profitability of selected relative strength portfolios based on unexpected returns. In 
each month t, J-month/K-month (J ×  K) portfolios are formed in the following way. K-month cumulative 
returns are calculated based on a ranking in ascending order of stocks according to their previous J-month 
returns. The top decile of the sorted stocks is labeled the ‘winner’ portfolio and the bottom decile the 
‘loser’ portfolio. The ‘winner–loser’ portfolio reports the strategy of going long in winners and short in 
losers. The monthly cumulative returns on these three portfolios are reported. Panel A contains the returns 
in the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) sample period, January 1965 – December 1989. Panel B presents the 
returns in the extended January 1965 – December 2005 sample period. The portfolios are equally-
weighted at formation date. Portfolio formation takes place immediately after ranking is done. The t-
statistics are given in parentheses. Each sample consists of all NYSE and AMEX stocks on monthly 
CRSP files with more than twenty-four return observations available over the sample period. 
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Appendix 
Table A1  
Profitability of relative strength portfolios based on raw returns, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
      Panel A: 1965-1989 Panel B: 1965-2005 
 J    K = 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 
3 Winner  0.0117 0.0143 0.0147 0.0152 0.0129 0.0152 0.0169 0.0163 
   (2.56) (3.22) (3.05) (3.73) (3.27) (4.02) (4.74) (4.13) 
3 Loser  0.0145 0.0109 0.0107 0.0090 0.0186 0.0148 0.0137 0.0126 
   (2.69) (2.26) (1.97) (2.33) (4.09) (3.52) (3.31) (3.36) 
3 Winner-Loser -0.0028 0.0034 0.0040 0.0063 -0.0057 0.0005 0.0032 0.0038 
   (-1.06) (1.62) (1.57) (2.65) (-2.08) (0.23) (1.36) (1.50) 
            
6 Winner  0.0154 0.0167 0.0167 0.0148 0.0176 0.0182 0.0181 0.0160 
   (3.34) (3.70) (3.50) (3.74) (4.49) (4.97) (5.23) (4.07) 
6 Loser  0.0132 0.0109 0.0085 0.0105 0.0171 0.0146 0.0126 0.0141 
   (2.36) (2.20) (1.53) (2.49) (3.51) (3.33) (2.94) (3.53) 
6 Winner-Loser 0.0022 0.0059 0.0083 0.0043 0.0005 0.0037 0.0055 0.0019 
   (0.71) (2.37) (2.82) (1.75) (0.17) (1.62) (2.14) (0.69) 
            
9 Winner  0.0176 0.0184 0.0165 0.0149 0.0191 0.0187 0.0173 0.0149 
   (3.75) (4.12) (3.40) (4.00) (4.82) (4.94) (4.95) (4.40) 
9 Loser  0.0118 0.0091 0.0091 0.0111 0.0162 0.0136 0.0138 0.0155 
   (2.11) (1.83) (1.60) (2.43) (3.33) (3.08) (3.05) (3.58) 
9 Winner-Loser 0.0058 0.0093 0.0074 0.0037 0.0029 0.0051 0.0035 -0.0006 
   (1.83) (3.61) (2.67) (1.44) (0.93) (2.05) (1.32) (-0.22) 
            
12 Winner  0.0185 0.0180 0.0151 0.0150 0.0189 0.0174 0.0163 0.0142 
   (3.93) (4.07) (3.21) (3.94) (4.75) (4.61) (4.87) (4.24) 
12 Loser  0.0099 0.0098 0.0102 0.0116 0.0150 0.0147 0.0145 0.0164 
   (1.78) (1.94) (1.75) (2.58) (3.12) (3.29) (3.16) (3.69) 
12 Winner-Loser 0.0086 0.0082 0.0049 0.0034 0.0040 0.0027 0.0017 -0.0021 
      (2.84) (3.53) (1.72) (1.49) (1.28) (1.01) (0.65) (-0.75) 
This table reports the profitability of selected relative strength portfolios based on raw returns. In each 
month t, J-month/K-month (J ×  K) portfolios are formed in the following way. J-month cumulative 
returns are calculated based on a ranking in ascending order of stocks according to their previous J-month 
returns. The top decile of the sorted stocks is labeled the ‘winner’ portfolio and the bottom decile the 
‘loser’ portfolio. The ‘winner–loser’ portfolio reports the strategy of going long in winners and short in 
losers. The monthly cumulative returns on these three portfolios are reported. Panel A contains the returns 
in the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) sample period, January 1965 – December 1989. Panel B presents the 
returns in the extended January 1965 – December 2005 sample period. The portfolios are equally-
weighted at formation date. Portfolio formation takes place immediately after ranking is done. The t-
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statistics are given in parentheses. Each sample consists of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks on 
monthly CRSP files with more than twenty-four return observations available over the sample period. 
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Table A2 
Profitability of relative strength portfolios based on unexpected returns, NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ 
   Panel A: 1965-1989 Panel B: 1965-2005 
J  K = 3 6 9 12 3 6 9 12 
3 Winner  -0.0046 -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0036 -0.0013 0.0001 -0.0005 
   (-3.03) (-1.24) (-0.80) (-0.50) (-2.06) (-0.88) (0.06) (-0.25) 
3 Loser  0.0049 0.0005 0.0007 -0.0014 0.0086 0.0042 0.0038 0.0020 
   (2.52) (0.30) (0.39) (-0.93) (3.93) (2.07) (1.94) (1.04) 
3 Winner-Loser -0.0094 -0.0021 -0.0019 0.0007 -0.0122 -0.0055 -0.0037 -0.0025 
   (-3.50) (-0.93) (-0.73) (0.25) (-4.42) (-2.49) (-1.59) (-0.91) 
           
6 Winner  -0.0022 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0021 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0018 
   (-1.36) (-0.65) (-0.35) (-1.31) (-0.18) (0.36) (0.16) (-0.96) 
6 Loser  0.0044 0.0017 0.0005 0.0007 0.0081 0.0053 0.0040 0.0050 
   (2.00) (0.98) (0.24) (0.47) (3.14) (2.36) (1.83) (2.50) 
6 Winner-Loser -0.0065 -0.0027 -0.0011 -0.0028 -0.0084 -0.0048 -0.0038 -0.0068 
   (-2.13) (-1.07) (-0.34) (-1.10) (-2.57) (-2.02) (-1.45) (-2.45) 
           
9 Winner  -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0019 -0.0029 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0038 
   (-0.51) (-0.02) (-1.20) (-1.93) (0.11) (-0.07) (-1.29) (-2.23) 
9 Loser  0.0043 0.0010 0.0014 0.0022 0.0087 0.0054 0.0057 0.0069 
   (1.97) (0.51) (0.68) (1.15) (3.40) (2.28) (2.45) (2.75) 
9 Winner-Loser -0.0052 -0.0010 -0.0033 -0.0051 -0.0085 -0.0055 -0.0073 -0.0107 
   (-1.62) (-0.37) (-1.10) (-1.78) (-2.73) (-2.08) (-2.60) (-3.27) 
           
12 Winner  -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0037 -0.0033 -0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0032 -0.0052 
   (-0.41) (-0.93) (-2.45) (-2.42) (-0.29) (-1.30) (-2.67) (-3.10) 
12 Loser  0.0031 0.0025 0.0031 0.0036 0.0076 0.0074 0.0073 0.0085 
   (1.47) (1.39) (1.43) (2.03) (3.06) (3.04) (2.96) (3.21) 
12 Winner-Loser -0.0038 -0.0038 -0.0068 -0.0069 -0.0081 -0.0094 -0.0105 -0.0136 
   (-1.26) (-1.57) (-2.26) (-2.77) (-2.65) (-3.32) (-3.62) (-4.02) 
This table reports the profitability of selected relative strength portfolios based on unexpected returns. In 
each month t, J-month/K-month (J ×  K) portfolios are formed in the following way. K-month cumulative 
returns are calculated based on a ranking in ascending order of stocks according to their previous J-month 
returns. The top decile of the sorted stocks is labeled the ‘winner’ portfolio and the bottom decile the 
‘loser’ portfolio. The ‘winner–loser’ portfolio reports the strategy of going long in winners and short in 
losers. The monthly cumulative returns on these three portfolios are reported. Panel A contains the returns 
in the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) sample period, January 1965 – December 1989. Panel B presents the 
returns in the extended January 1965 – December 2005 sample period. The portfolios are equally-
weighted at formation date. Portfolio formation takes place immediately after ranking is done. The t-
statistics are given in parentheses. Each sample consists of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks on 
monthly CRSP files with more than twenty-four return observations available over the sample period. 
